Involuntarily answering the call from Friedrich Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer, Søren Kierkegaard criticizes almost all the past great thinkers, one after another, specifically on their perspectives on the truth. Whether he is René Descartes or even the “divine Plato,” Kierkegaard does not seem to spare any, except for one: Socrates. Dubbed “the Socratic ignorance” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, the Socratic perspective[1] will receive absolute support from Kierkegaard when he expresses his definition on the truth: “An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth” (Kierkegaard 207). Understanding the relationship between the above statement and that of Socrates will be critical for further examination of Kierkegaard’s ideas, since one can argue Kierkegaard builds upon the very formidable foundation Socrates has established. Therefore, in this short paper, I will demonstrate how Kierkegaard’s perspective reconciles “the Socratic ignorance” by first presenting his offense on the desire for objective truth and later his thoughts on Socrates.
In the Postscripts, Kierkegaard attacks the desire for objective truth when stating: “Only in subjectivity is there decision, whereas wanting to become objective is untruth” (206). Understanding this statement requires one to note that prior to this statement, Kierkegaard firmly refers to the point that not a single decision can be infinite, even when looking from an objective point of view. Thus, the distinction between good and evil, truth and falsehood and even the principle of contradiction blurs (206). Therefore, Kierkegaard concludes since the passion of the infinite is subjectivity, truth must be subjectivity also. This makes a timely segue way into exploring how Kierkegaard’s confrontation with the objectivity of truth unearths Socrates’s thousand-year-old paradigm of “paganism” (207).
The major difference between the Socratic and the Platonic, according to Kierkegaard, is precisely that the latter invokes speculative thoughts, whereas the former focuses on the existence. This is, in Kierkegaard’s view, “where the road swings off” (208). The reason why Kierkegaard blames Plato for involving the use of speculation is explained in his footnote: “To emphasize existence, which contains within it the qualification of inwardness, is the Socratic, whereas the Platonic is to pursue recollection and immanence” (209). What Socrates essentially demonstrates through his simple ignorance and paradox is that by admitting the pursuit of knowledge as an “infinite merit,” he effectively implies the essential characteristic of an existing person, whereas Plato may have sidetracked and emphasized the “Theory of Recollection” too much on the pursuit of knowledge. According to Kierkegaard, those who pursue knowledge should be ruled out since they all participate in becoming, in the strict sense of certainty.[2]
On the other hand, Kierkegaard does not reserve his praises for Socrates: “Socratic ignorance is an analog to the category of the absurd, except that there is even less objective certainty in the repulsion exerted by the absurd, since there is only the certainty that it is absurd, and for that very reason there is infinitely greater resilience in the inwardness” (208). By stating so, he inherently admits a Socratic influence on his philosophy. Kierkegaard then concludes: “Socratic ignorance is an expression of the objective uncertainty; the inwardness of the existing person is truth” (208). This, as I have mentioned above, is necessarily Kierkegaard’s conclusion after his quest for the essence of the truth.
Clearly, the Socratic call for humility in philosophy contains a much deeper meaning, and one that is viewed with high regards by Kierkegaard. It demonstrates what Kierkegaard claims to be the truth: “an objective uncertainty, with the most passionate inwardness.” It is now clear where the two philosophers cross.
Work Cited
Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. The Essential Kierkegaard. Ed. and Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000. 187-246. Print.
