The Value of the Soul

The Value of the Soul

More than two millennia have passed, and Thrasymachus’s challenge to Plato still remains intact.[1] Truly, in order to better understand this issue, I would have to seek an answer to the ancient questions: “where do humans come from? Why are we born into this world?” It may remain doubtful as to how these questions will be able to shed some lights on the issue, but clearly, these questions will require me to carefully examine what the true path to happiness is, according to an ancient Greek thinker like Plato. Achieving this task is certainly not easy. Fortunately, in Timaeus and Phaedo, Plato offers a solution, by introducing the idea of the “world-soul” and the “human-soul.” Only when one directs his or her soul to the “world-soul” can he or she find the true valuable possessions in life: “Now we ought to think of the most sovereign part of our soul as god’s gift to us, given to be our guiding spirit. This, of course, is the type of soul that, as we maintain, resides in the top part of our bodies. It raises us up away from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven ...” (Plato, Tim. 90a). Therefore, I begin with an investigation into the nature of the “world-soul,” followed by an examination of the “human-soul” and finally, I will discuss the linkage between the two souls and the function of the “world-soul” vis-à-vis knowledge, order and rule. Clearly, only when a linkage between the two souls is established that one can seek the true path to happiness in life.

The idea of how the world-soul is formulated is first introduced in the middle of a long speech delivered by Timaeus in a book that borrows his name:

In between Being that is indivisible and always changeless, and the one that is divisible and comes to be in the corporeal realm, he mixed a third, intermediate form of being, derived from the other two. And he took the three mixtures of the Same, and the one of the Different, in between their indivisible and their corporeal, divisible counter parts. And he took the three mixtures and mixed them together to make a uniform mixture, forcing the Different, which was hard to mix, into conformity with the Same. (35ab)

Here, the “world-soul” is vividly described as consisting of three elements: indivisible being, divisible being and an intermediate form between the two. It is also important to see that the “indivisible being” Plato describes is no doubt an essential feature of the Form, and which is heavily influenced by a Parmenidian idea: “There is the way that it is and it cannot not be” (Waterfield, Par. 58 F3). Thus, an important feature of the “indivisible being” is its entirety and eternality. However, Plato does not back up or shy away from clearly stating that we all participate in being, which is a central characteristic of his Theory of Form. Next, Plato points out an important condition for knowledge, which is a characteristic of the “world-soul:”

... because it [the world-soul] is divided up and bound together in various proportions [of Same, Different and the intermediary], and because it circles round upon itself, then, whenever it comes into contact with something whose being is scatterable or else with something whose being is indivisible, it is stirred throughout it whole self. It then declares what exact that thing is the same as, or what it is different from, and in what respect and in what manner, as well as when, it turns out that they are the same or different and are characterized as such. (Plato, Tim. 37ab)

Here the “world-soul” expresses in itself the urge to sort out disorder, which can also be interpreted as a desire for knowledge. This portrayal is reinforced by an earlier passage: “The god wanted everything to be good and nothing to be bad so far as that was possible, and so he took over all that was visible—not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion—and brought it from a state of disorder to one of order, because he believed that order was in every way better than disorder” (30a). So far, I have pointed out that the “world-soul” is eternal, indivisible and possesses the ability as well as the urge to seek order out of disorder.

This important description of the “world-soul” should be kept in mind as I examine the nature of the “human-soul,” and how the two souls come together in harmony: “When he [the Demiurge] had finished this speech, he turned again to the mixing bowl he had used before, the one in which he had blended and mixed the soul of the universe. He began to pour into it what remained of the previous ingredients and to mix them in somewhat the same way, though these were no longer invariably and constantly pure , but of a second and third grade of purity” (41d). Here Plato suggests that clearly even the human soul, which is the purest part of us, is flawed right at the beginning of its creation, characterized by the impure ingredients in the mixing bowl. These impure portions are what differ between mortality and immortality, as I will examine later.

The following passage also reinforces this idea: “ ... And so when certain sensations come in from outside and attack them, they sweep the soul’s entire vessel along with them. It is then that these revolutions, however much in control they seem to be, are actually under their control. All these disturbances are no doubt the reason why even today and not only at the beginning, whenever a soul is bound within a mortal body, it at first lacks intelligence” (44a). Clearly, this idea can be easily understood by the Platonic principle of the Tripartite Soul, which includes the appetitive soul, the spirited soul and the rational soul. Governed by sensations, the appetitive soul drives human’s thirst for material benefits, including food, money, sex, etc. Without proper constraints from the rational soul, the appetitive soul will eventually lead human to a path of self-destruction. This explains the irrationality and the constant struggle between the “have-s” and “have-nots” I have described right at the beginning. Recalling from earlier that the “world-soul” itself consists of the ability to reason and to grasp intelligence, it is clear this is where Plato points out the major discrepancy between the “world-soul” and the “human-soul.”

Thus, in order to conform to the “world-soul,” Plato suggests a disciplined path of reintegrating with the “world-soul”:

And to the extent that is fitting for them to possess something that shares our names of ‘immortal,’ something described as divine and ruling within those of them who always consent to follow after justice and after you, I shall begin by sowing that seed, and then hand it over to you. The rest of the task is yours. Weave what is mortal to what is immortal, fashion and beget living things. Give them food, cause them to grow, and when they perish, receive them back again. (41cd)

It is worth noting that even though this seems to be a daunting task, Plato does not suggest that this path is impossible, as the god has clearly instructed that human souls can be “received back again.” Here, it is important to make a clear distinction that only the immortal part will be welcomed back to the land of the god, as the mortal part will “perish.” This immortal part is nothing but the soul, as proven earlier when examining the different characteristics of the soul. Recalling earlier with the passage about the mixing bowl, the god will Therefore, after examining the nature of the “world-soul” and the “human-soul,” the last task left is to examine the possibility to “raise us up way from the earth and toward what is akin to us in heaven” (90a). This is when arguably the most important of all the Platonic principles, or the role of education and the love of wisdom, comes into play:

So if a man has become absorbed in his appetites or his ambitions and takes great pains to further them, all his thoughts are bound to become merely mortal ... On the other hand, if a man has seriously devoted himself to the love of learning and to true wisdom, if he has exercised these aspects of himself above all, then there is absolutely no way that his thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine, should truth come within his grasp. (90b, emphasis added)

Thus, even though thrown off course right at the beginning of our birth (44a), this passage shows that there is truly a way that we can turn and direct out souls to that of the “world-soul,” and this is the one path everyone should seek for, as this is the only guaranteed path of securing “immortality.” However, there remains a last question I have to answer: “what is the function of the world-soul vis-à-vis knowledge?” Only when successfully solve this puzzle, can I fully explain the true path that Plato suggests. In order to achieve this task, I will examine a passage in Phaedo: “One he [Anaxagoras] had given the best of each as the cause for each and the general cause of all, I thought he would go on to explain the common good for all ... This wonderful hope was dashed as I went on reading and saw that the man made no use of Mind, nor gave it any responsibility for the management of things ...” (Pha. 98b). Here, Plato expresses his disappointment in Anaxagoras’s reasoning, as he falls short of explaining a sufficiently final cause, by only supporting the material cause. Next, Plato explains that there exists a metaphysical final cause: “I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and to find the soul to be immortal” (100b). Finally, he points out how this final cause can only be achieved by acquiring knowledge: “ ... for the soul goes to the underworld possessing nothing but its education and upbringing, which are said to bring the greatest benefit or harm to the dead right at the beginning of the journey yonder” (107d). Thus, I have shown that according to the Platonic principles, there exists a final cause, in the form of Beauty or Good, and that the only path to this cause is through purification, which is a separation of the soul and the body (67c). Since the body is incapable of possessing or exercising knowledge (65b), the only path is to nourish the rational soul with proper education. Thus, it is conclusive that in order to be harmonic with the “world-soul,” the “human-soul” must seek a disciplined pursuit of knowledge and wisdom, which eventually will bring about order in this chaotic world.

After all, since ancient times, human beings have an urge to seek honor that would last forever, for we believe this is a path of being immortal and god-like. As a result, thousands of human lives were traded for the creation of the Great Wall of China, or the pyramids of Egypt. Plato points out in Symposium that this is sadly human nature: “Look, if you will, at how human beings seek honor. You’d [Socrates] be amazed at their irrationality, if you didn’t have in mind what I [Diotima] spoke about and if you hadn’t pondered the awful state of love they’re in, wanting to become famous and ‘to lay up glory immortal forever ... ” (Sym. 208c). Today, human’s love for honor and immortality exists in a different form, through the accumulation of wealth and power. Unfortunately, according to Plato, there cannot be a more distant and confused path to immortality than this love of honor. The true path, as I have examined, is to harmonize the “human-soul,” which is flawed and impure, and the “world-soul,” which is the only eternal being that can sort out orders from disorders, through proper education and love of wisdom. In the end, will an individual choose to be a wealthy corporate titan that is forever remembered as a greedy and selfish being or to be someone like Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, whose only achievements were to simply refuse to obey the injustice of the society, but as a result, pushing human’s social evolution into a whole new different chapter?[2]

“I pledge my honor that I have neither received nor provided unauthorized assistance during the completion of this work.”

Works Cited

Plato. Timaeus. Trans. Donald J. Zeyl. Plato Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1997. 1292 - 1306. Print.

———. Phaedo. Trans. G.M.A Grube. Plato Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1997. 49 - 100. Print.

———. Symposium. Trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Plato Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1997. 457 - 505. Print.

Waterfield, Robin, trans. Parmenides of Elea. The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 49 – 68. Print.

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[1] In The Republic, Thrasymachus points out to that power lies in those who possess immense wealth and political influence. Later, Plato defeats Thrasymachus by proving that wealth or political influence only satisfy human’s bodily desires, which the lowest part in a human soul. This is a relevant issue since the “Occupying Wall Street” movement’s primary objective is to fight against income inequality and very often, this is caused by greed and injustice by a minority group in the society.

[2] The author would like to express his utmost appreciation towards Professor Ronald Waite for his assistance during the completion of this work.

The Limit of the Law through a Philosophical Lens

The Limit of the Law through a Philosophical Lens

Arcesilaus of Aeolis once made a statement that can easily sum up, ironically, the positive correlation between a legal system and injustice: “Where you find the laws most numerous, there you will find also the greatest injustice” (Quotationspage.com). Typically, a wonderful legal system is often put in place by a system of checks-and-balances to ensure any defendants will be treated equally in the eye of the goddess of justice. This system will generally include a sophisticated jury and a rational judge. At first, this system works so well even Heraclitus of Ephesus advises that everyone should abide by the law: “ ... as a state stands by the law ... For all human laws are in keeping of the one divine law; for the one divine law has as much power as it wishes, is an unfailing defence for all laws, and prevails over all laws” (Waterfield, “Heraclitus of Ephesus” 39 F12). But what if the laws today’s societies tolerate are unjust, Heraclitus? Certainly, no rational beings actually believe that any legal system in the world is completely sound. In fact, they are all seriously flawed and therefore, the question which has been raised for thousands of years remains: “What is the root of the problem?” One theory seems to explain this: the deception of human beings’ sensory perception.

Thus, the purpose of this paper will be to examine, based on various fragments that Heraclitus develops as well as testimonies from his contemporaries, how exactly the laws are treated under the influence of the senses. This will be greatly helpful when I attempt to understand why certain laws fail and whether human beings are really in any positions to legislate just laws.

Right at the beginning, Heraclitus points out the major difference between human beings and the divinity: “Unlike divine nature, human nature lacks sound judgements” (37-8 F2). Recalling from earlier that Heraclitus claims “all human laws are in keeping of the one divine law,” I notice a paradox in Heraclitus’s different fragments. Strangely, if “human nature lacks sound judgements,” how will it be possible for a society to prevail over a set of rules that are created by “human nature” itself? Nevertheless, I should keep in mind that the nickname the “Obscure” is granted to Heraclitus for a reason.

Let me now move on and carefully examine Heraclitus’s texts to find out what his perspectives on the human’s senses are: “ ‘It is impossible to step twice into the same river,’ as Heraclitus says ... ‘It scatters and regathers, comes together and dissolves, approaches and departs’ (41 F34). Most people who come across this fragment and concern for the first time will take what I call the “surface-level” interpretation—that Heraclitus believes in an ever-changing universe. However, the translator Waterfield offers us a wonderful explanation: “This of course relates to Heraclitus’ skepticism about the evidence of the senses: there is nothing on the face of the world that we can securely grasp or base our moral opinions on; so we had better wake up and look to the underlying stability and unity of things” (34). Here, Heraclitus introduces the idea of the fallacy of sensation, which is, truly, the root of all evils.

In order to further understand this issue, let us step back and consider what the primary difference between being awake and asleep is, literally, for human beings. When I let my body at rest, I relax most of my senses, and thus I am less capable of what is going on around me. When I wake up, all my senses spring to work, and help me recognize my surroundings. Or do they? Heraclitus points out at the beginning of F1 that this has never been the case right: “... But the general run of people are unaware of their actions while awake as they are of what they do while asleep” (37 F1). Thus, for a majority of people, the sense tricks them into only seeing things as they appear to be, and misguides us into a realm of illusions. Sensation allures human beings into the “what-is-not,” which, according to Parmenides of Elea, is a clear dead-end. In F8, he confirms: “ ... Therefore all those things which mortal men, / Trusting in their true reality, have proposed, are no more than names-/ Both bird and perishing, both being and not being, / Change of place, and alteration of bright colouring” (60 F8). However, I should not completely discredit our senses, for they provide the easiest means for human beings to interact with the surroundings. In fact, many philosophers, including Aristotle, highly regard the importance of our senses: “All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight” (Aristotle 689).

What I would like to condemn is the combination of the senses and the human’s ignorance, stemmed from a herd mentality that most human beings adopt. This critical clarification is also supported by Heraclitus: “But of this principle which holds forever people prove ignorant, not only before they hear it, but also once they have heard of it” (37 F1, emphasis added). At this point, it is worth noting that the word “forever” is perhaps the most important word in this statement. According to Waterfield, even Aristotle misunderstands Heraclitus for he is unsure as to whether the word “forever” should go with the previous phrase, “But of this principle which holds” or with the phrase followed right after, “people prove ignorant.” Indeed, to Heraclitus, the word should cleave to both phrases (316-17). Thus, it is conclusive to say that what Heraclitus is trying to condemn here is the unchanging insensitivity of human beings to the surrounding universe, blinded by their sensory perception.

Fortunately, the “Obscure” does not just abandon human beings in the midst of doubt as to where the path to apprehend the logos really is. He clearly advises all mankind to always seek the true path: “And so one ought to follow what is common. Although the principle [logos] is common, the majority of people live as though they had private understanding” (38 F6). Therefore, how will it be possible for these “ignorant souls” to seek the common? Ironically, according to Heraclitus, the senses, undoubtedly, play a rather important role on this quest: “The things I rate highly are those which are accessible to sight, hearing, apprehension” (41 F28). This may seem rather paradoxical at first whereas I already examined earlier that Heraclitus condemns the senses as a mere barrier between human beings and the logos. However, for those who are familiar with Heraclitus’s texts, it is not bizarre to observe his intention behind the use of opposite elements. F21 hints to me that Heraclitus believes in the harmony created from contraries: “They are ignorant of how while tending away it agrees with itself—a back-turning harmony, like a bow or a lyre” (40 F21). Therefore, I must figure out a way, based on Heraclitus’s guidance, to justify the link between human and the divine law by relying on sensitive attunement. Heraclitus, again, provides me with a hint, despite how obscure it is: “Everyone has the potential for self-knowledge and sound thinking” (41 F31). This optimistic and upbeat statement is quite contradicting to most of the fragments I have studied so far, since earlier, I have looked at how disdainful Heraclitus is towards the ignorance of human beings. Nevertheless, according to Heraclitus, what constitutes the link between human and the divine law must involve the methodology of self-introspection and our sensory perception. Only when being able to harmonize the two can human beings reach the true path to the logos.

Let me step back and examine what the real consequences of a legal system that is blindfolded purely by the senses are. Many people’s memories and impression of the racial and social segregation in the United States may have dimmed with the sands of time. Yet I can still easily find evidence of an exciting time when Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King started fighting against the injustice in the society. Back then, the most popular sign on the streets was perhaps: “No blacks allowed.” One should bear in mind that this complete injustice was recognized by the legal system and thus, was generally acceptable in the society back then. As I see in the case of the segregation in the United States in the last century, what ultimately decides the final judgment comprises of mostly what the senses create—perhaps this is where the word “eyewitness” comes from in our dictionary. To make matters worse, the legal clauses that we all rely on are made up of beliefs, again created by sensations, hundreds of years ago. However, fortunately, Heraclitus offers a methodology that can possibly create bondage between human beings and the divine law: a harmony between sensory perception and constant introspection into the self. Yet this path remains unclear and not until later that Plato comes to the assistance with his insights into a more comprehensive solution. For now, an insight raised by one of the Associate Justices of the United States Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter, is worth examined regarding our legal systems: “Fragile as reason is and limited as law is as the institutionalised medium of reason, that’s all we have between us and the tyranny of mere will and the cruelty of unbridled, undisciplined feelings” (Quotationspage.com).[1]

“I pledge my honor that I have neither received nor provided unauthorized assistance during the completion of this work.”

Works Cited

Arcesilaus. The Quotations Page. 2010. 18 September 2011. Web.

Aristotle. "Metaphysica." The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 2001. 689 - 926. Print.

Frankfurter, Felix. The Quotations Page. 2010. 18 September 2011. Web.

Waterfield, Robin, trans. “Heraclitus of Ephesus.” The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and the Sophists. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 32 - 48. Print.

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[1] The author would like to express his utmost appreciation towards Professor Ronald Waite for his assistance during the completion of this work.

To Be or Not To Be Certain: The Fall of René Descartes

To Be or Not To Be Certain: The Fall of René Descartes

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One of Buddhism’s most cited commandments goes straight into the heart of human weakness, “the greatest enemy of one’s life is oneself.” What this Buddhist teaching says is we human beings have a tendency of abusing the confidence and integrity in our own abilities, thus leading us to the problem of making purely intuitive decisions. Possibly, unimaginable consequences can happen as a result, which the recent financial crisis has granted us several examples. In addition, Plato also touches upon this critical point in his work Plato’s Republic, “they [a group of prisoners chained together in a cave] see only the shadows the light from the fire throws on the wall of the cave in front of them – their own shadows or those of the objects passing behind the wall” (257, emphasis added). Plato implies that with only a limited source of light and a limited angle of view, a prisoner may only see certain images of the shadows inside the cave, and believe these are true images, while in fact, they are simply deceived by their own mind. This idea is consistent with the concept of uncertainty in our judgment mentioned earlier. However, René Descartes, one of the most influential philosophers in Europe in the 17^th century, offers us a unique solution—a method that will solve our quest for certainty in philosophy. As a profound mathematician and scientist, Descartes utilizes the power of logic in different sciences to arrive at a step-by-step methodology, which he details in Discourse on the Method, and later applies this methodology to prove the existence of God. Sadly, what Descartes offers in the end is simply a flawed process, built upon his very own foundation of logical superiority. Ironically, his most prominent argument and proof of the existence of God, is also one of his weakest links, and thus will be used to show that Descartes suffers from the same weakness human beings possess: overconfidence in our abilities. Consequently, by demonstrating that his proof of God’s existence is flawed, I also succeed in concluding Descartes has failed in achieving absolute certainty in philosophy.

Therefore, I begin this paper by introducing Descartes’s methodology of reasoning in philosophy and a critical concept of pre-supposition, the foundation of his argument. Next, I examine Descartes’s process of proving God’s existence and finally, I look at the origin of the internal contradiction in Descartes’s logic, which stems from his very concepts of formal reality and objective reality, causation, infinite and finite substances. In order to finish the last task, I also borrow Friedrich Nietzsche’s school of thought to cast a doubt over Descartes’s conclusion.

First, let us examine Descartes’s description of his methodology, as described in Discourse on the Method:

The first was never to accept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of this truth ... The second, to divide each of the difficulties I examined into as many parts as possible and as may be required in order to resolve them better ... The third, to direct my thoughts in an orderly manner, by beginning with the simplest and most easily known objects in order to ascend little by little, step by step, ... the last, throughout to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so comprehensive, that I could be sure of leaving nothing out.” (29, emphasis added)

Since it is almost impossible for one to discover any flaws in this logical flow, he or she should look into some critical presumptions embedded in Descartes’s proof. According to Descartes, only when satisfying these conditions, will one succeed in moving on, “ ... provided we refrain from accepting anything as true which is not, and always keep to the order required for deducing one thing from another, there can be nothing too remote to be reached in the end or too well hidden to be discovered” (Dis. 29, emphasis added). Here Descartes proposes that, just as when building a house, one needs a solid foundation. Thus, only when this foundation is insecure, will the structure of the house be affected. Let us then look at how firm Descartes’s “house” is.

The first critical Cartesian concept in the proof of God’s existence is the relationship between cause and effect. In Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes states, “now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause ... It follows from this both that something cannot arise from nothing, and also that what is more perfect—that is, contains in itself more reality—cannot arise from what is less perfect” (Med. 91). Essentially, there exists a possessive relationship between a cause and an effect. One thing cannot possibly arise out of nothing, and thus an effect must stem from a cause, which obviously possesses more superior characteristics than the effect, since an effect can only contain at most equal to, or usually less than, the same characteristics as the cause. Indeed, this causal relationship will later be central to show the internal contradiction in Descartes’s logic.

The second important proposition is the origin of an idea, for one must question where the idea comes from, which is effectively a causal relationship. According to Descartes, there appear to be three origins of ideas, “among my ideas, some appear to be innate, some to be adventitious, and others to have been invented by me” (Med. 89). Ultimately, Descartes proves that the idea of God is innate, and this will be a critical point to exploit later. However, he arrives at this conclusion only after abandoning the idea of God as coming from neither adventitious, or outside sources, nor self-invented origin. In Principles of Philosophy, Descartes states:

Furthermore, we cannot have within us the idea or image of anything without there being somewhere, either within us or outside us, an original which contains in reality all the perfections belonging to the idea. And since the supreme perfections of which we have an idea are in no way to be found in us, we rightly conclude that they reside in something distinct from ourselves, namely God ... (167, emphasis added)

Here Descartes implies that an idea of a being as infinite as God cannot possibly come from any finite sources, such as human beings, nor come from any collection of outside sources, since these are by nature finite as well.

Finally, the last proposition is the relationship between objective reality and formal reality. Descartes mentions this relationship in the Third Meditation, “undoubtedly, the ideas which represent substances to me amount to something more and, so to speak, contain within themselves more objective reality than the ideas which merely represent modes or accidents” (Med. 90). [1] Descartes believes that every object of an idea originally possesses its unique formal reality, which is that any idea has the same form, but just different content. Stemming from this, an objective reality of an idea merely reflects the formal reality to which the idea refers to. Nonetheless, how does Descartes connect this concept to the existence of God? In Objections and Replies, he claims, “but we have an idea of God (Def. II and VIII), and the objective reality of this idea is not contained in us either formally or eminently (Axiom VI); moreover it cannot be contained in any other being except God himself (Def. VIII). Therefore this idea of God, which is in us, must have God as it cause ... ” (Obj. 157). In this quotation, Descartes uses the concept of objective reality to challenge the notion that it is not possible for a finite substance, such as human being, to be the cause of an idea containing infinite objective reality, thus proving God cannot possibly come from one’s self-invention. He clearly restates this point at the beginning of Meditations on First Philosophy:

One such problem, among others, is how the idea of a supremely perfect being, which is in us, possesses so much objective reality that it can come only from a cause which is supremely perfect. In the Replies this is illustrated by the comparison of a very perfect machine, the idea which is in the mind of some engineer. Just as the objective intricacy belonging to the idea must have some cause, namely the scientific knowledge of the engineer, or of someone else who passed the idea onto him, so the idea of God which is in us must have God himself as its cause. (75)

With all these points tied together, Descartes concludes, with absolute certainty, that, if we accept his methodology and these propositions, God’s existence can be proven. This conclusion is based on first, the innate idea of God, second, the causal principle which states that the cause necessarily contains infinite formal reality, and finally, no cause can contain this infinite characteristic other than God himself. Descartes later admits in Principles of Philosophy, “finally, we will see that besides the notions of God and of our mind, we have within us knowledge of many propositions which are eternally true, such as ‘Nothing comes from nothing’ ... When we contrast all this knowledge with the confused thoughts we had before, we will acquire the habit of forming clear and distinct concepts of all the things that can be known” (188, emphasis added). Thus, if I successfully attempt at casting even a tiniest doubt over Descartes’s reasoning, my objective will be met and Descartes’s foundation of the argument for God’s existence will no longer be formidable.

In order to disprove Descartes’s points, I first have to discredit his propositions and point out if there is any imperfection in his reasoning. First, the ideas raised by Friedrich Nietzsche, who believes that one should only focus on his or her current life instead of believing in imaginative world, helps shed some lights on Descartes’s propositions. In his work Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche goes straight to demolish any idea of causation:

The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The “why?” shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause- a cause that is comforting, liberating, and relieving ... Thus one searches not only for some kind of explanation to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation ... one kind of positing of causes predominates more and more, is concentrated into a system, and finally emerges as dominant, that is, as simply precluding other causes and explanations. (497 - 98, emphasis added)

Known for his combination of psychological thinking and philosophy, Nietzsche clearly points out to us the limits and flaws of the idea of causation, which is a critical presumption that Descartes makes in the quest to prove God’s existence. Here in this passage, he states that our need for an explanation is merely to serve our principal appetite and interest. Thus, he concludes that, “the banker immediately thinks of ‘business,’ the Christian of ‘sin,’ and the girl of her love” (498).

Regarding Descartes’s proposition on the origin of an idea, Nietzsche states:

All the highest values are of the first rank; all the highest concepts, that which has being, the unconditional, the good, the true, the perfect- all these cannot have become and must therefore be cause sui [self-caused]. All these, moreover, cannot be unlike each other or in contradiction to each other. Thus they arrive at their stupendous concept, “God.” That which is last, thinnest, and emptiest is put first, as the cause, as ens realissi-mum. (482)

Descartes proposes in his Meditations that human being is between God and nothingness, and that God is the purest, or in his own words, “eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent” (Med. 90). On the other hand, Nietzsche opposes that there is no such thing as a cause-effect relationship, and that God, if any, based on Descartes’s description, should be closer to nothingness, and thus has been misplaced in order. Finally, Nietzsche also abandons any idea of reality other than the reality of the world one lives in, “the reason for which ‘this’ world has been characterized as ‘apparent’ are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable” (484, emphasis added). Therefore, Nietzsche has clearly shown that what Descartes considers to be “eternally true” may leave contemporary minds with many doubts. Right at the beginning of Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche makes a sarcastic reference to this notion of eternity, “ ... this time they are not just idols of the age, but eternal idols, which are here touched with a hammer as with a tuning fork” (466, emphasis added). Thus, a call for more modesty not only in modern philosophy but also in human nature is both timely and essential to avoid any further consequences as a result of our decisions.

However, Nietzsche himself admits that any idea in this world, no matter how real or true it appears, merely comes from a subjective point of view. Thus, supporters of the Cartesian principles may not, after all, find Nietzsche’s psychological explanation of Descartes’s flaws appealing nor convincing. Let us then take on the arduous task of examining if Descartes indeed creates any internal contradiction in his logic. In essence, on the surface, Descartes’s proof of God’s existence is seamless, yet Descartes suffers from the same fallacy that any of us can easily commit to as a result of our subjective limitation. Earlier, I discuss the way Descartes proves that there exists a causal relationship, which he undoubtedly claims since something cannot arise out of nothing, a cause must have at least the same qualities, or by Descartes’s measurement, reality, as the effect, “ ... there must be at least as much in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause” (Med. 91, emphasis added). After this, he goes on and establishes that God is the ultimate cause. Besides, it is evident he states that God possesses infinite formal reality, as mentioned before. Therefore, following this logic, can one also state that human beings, as the effect of the cause, God, must contain this characteristic of the infinite formal reality as well? So far, my logic is coherent, and thus, this must lead one to conclude either human beings are infinite, or there exists another God. But this conclusion seems to violate some of Descartes’s propositions. First, human beings are finite, “ ... and hence that my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my perception of the finite, that is myself” (Med. 94). Second, there can only be one God, “ ... I cannot understand how there could be two or more Gods of this kind; and after supposing that one God exists ... ” (Med. 108). Apparently, there exists some internal contradiction in Descartes’s logic, thus allowing any rational beings to be skeptical of Descartes’s conclusion.

Let us however take a step back in order to clearly see the big picture. If there is only one infinite being, which is God, and he is the creator, or the ultimate cause, then all effects of this cause must be finite. On the other hand, the objective reality of the idea of God is infinite and there should only be one infinite being. Also, Descartes himself testifies that the objective reality of an idea represents the effect from some prior causes, which cannot be adventitious nor self-invented, as shown before, but innate. However, the objective reality of this idea of God cannot be infinite because in essence, all effects must be finite, as proven earlier. Consequently, Descartes must either abandon his pre-suppositions that the effect of a cause is finite, or that there exists only one infinite being. Now, it is as clear as the natural light that Descartes’s proof of God’s existence is flawed and doubtful. As mentioned earlier, even if I may cast even a tiniest doubt over his reasoning, I have accomplished what I set out to do: bringing down the formidable stronghold Descartes built. Undoubtedly, at the end of the day, what Descartes sets out to do from the beginning is simply building a dream within a dream, just as when Nietzsche raises the question, “is man merely a mistake of God’s? Or God merely a mistake of man’s?” (467).

Unfortunately, Descartes himself admits failing to prove God’s existence means he also fails to achieve absolute certainty in philosophy, “ ... the certainty and truth of all knowledge depends uniquely on my awareness of the true God, to such an extent that I was incapable of perfect knowledge about anything else until I became aware of him” (Med. 110). He has set out to demonstrate God’s existence by applying his rigid methodology, as well as some presumptions that were completely discredited by Friedrich Nietzsche and his psychological argument. Moreover, I have established the existence of a major flaw in Descartes’s argument, developed simply from his own logical argument. This really is a warning call for many, as apparently human nature often lets immodesty dictate our reasoning and decision-making process. In this case, I am looking at a major flaw made by one of the brightest minds in the history of philosophy and science. Indeed, any rational being should question one of mankind’s most ancient objectives, as Descartes describes, “ ... and thus make ourselves, as it were, the lords and masters of nature” (Dis. 47). How can human, a being that is so flawed just like many others, if not more, take control of this world? With crises after crises, with so much blood spilled, so many lives lost, this seems to be a difficult concept for many to swallow. For now, Nietzsche offers an answer, perhaps with a smile on his face, “man is more ape than any ape” (124). [2]

“I pledge my honor that I have neither received nor provided unauthorized assistance during the completion of this work.”

Works Cited

Descartes, René. Discourse on the Method. Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge UP, 2009. 20-56. Print.

———. Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge UP, 2009. 73–122. Print.

———. Objections and Replies. Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge UP, 2009. 123-159. Print.

———. Principles of Philosophy. Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge UP, 2009. 160-212. Print.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols. The Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books, 1982. Print.

Plato. Plato's Republic. Trans. Benjamin Jowett; rev. Albert A. Anderson. Millis, MA: Agora , 2001. Print.

Works Consulted

Waite, Ronald. Descartes’ Proof of God’s Existence (Mediation Three). 2011. Class Note.

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[1] Descartes proposes the differences in substance, modes and accidents based on the degree of reality each of them possesses. In particular, substance is a characteristic of a thing that can exist independently; mode is the

different forms or aspects of a substance; finally, accident is non-essential aspect of a thing and can be altered. The author would like to express appreciation towards Professor Ronald Waite for clarification of this Cartesian concept.

[2] The author would like to express his appreciation towards Professor Ronald Waite’s and the Writing Center’s assistance during the completion of this work.